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Abstract
One of the biggest questions of agglomerations today focuses on the
problem of the public transport supply. To deal with this, Bogota has de-
veloped a new urban transport system that has had worldwide recognition
since 2000: Transmilenio. While most studies have focused on studying
the impact of this new public transport system with respect to the envi-
ronment, hedonic prices, employment and urbanism, among others, none
(except one) have studied the question of the evolution of crime linked to
the existence of Transmilenio. The aim of this article is to demonstrate
that the evolution of urban transport, which is traduced on the construc-
tion and on the improvements of Transmilenio, has had a direct impact
on the crime rates in the city. By collecting a set of spatially referenced
data regarding crimes in 112 of the 117 planning zones that make up the
city, this research follows a di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology to test
the causality of the transport system in the evolution of crime rates in
each zone for di¤erent periods. After a deep descriptive analysis of data
and the implementation of the econometric methodology suggested, re-
sults indicate that enhancement of the public transport system has had
no clear impact on crime rates in all zones of the city. Depending on the
zones and on the Transmilenio line in question, the transport system may
increase or decrease the number of crimes on each zone beneciaries or
not from the improvement of the system. However, this research gives a
non-negligible number of hints to take in consideration on further studies.
JEL Codes: K42, R23, R49
Keywords: Improvements of public transports; Crime; Causality; Dif-
ferences in di¤erences.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Literature review and research question
From the early seventies, crime began to be studied from the point of view of
Economics1 . This new theory, called the theory of crime, was supported by
the fact that criminals are rational and hence are able to compute their expected
utilities with respect to the probability of being caught by the forces of law and
order. In addition, this theory rests on the fact that criminals have the capacity
to make a cost/benet analysis between their expected utility when they commit
a crime and their expected utility if they undertake another kind of lucrative
activity at the same time.
Since this rst study that gave birth to the theory of crime, several re-
searchers have conrmed that the empowerment of police in the city has a
negative e¤ect on the spread of criminality (Ehrlich 1975, Bryett Freeman 1996,
Glaeser 1996) between others. However, as Moreno (2005) remarked in his
research, Cameron (1988) demonstrated that this e¤ect is not very easy to un-
derline because of the lack of data2 on cities and also because the decision
to increase police presence is also due to the fact that, generally, previous to
empowerment of the police in zones, crime was rising3 .
Nonetheless, the issue of urban crime has not been only considered from
the theory of crime. Research by Glaeser, Sacerote (1999), Brueckner, Thisse,
Zenou (1999) and Morselli, Royer (2008) has studied this topic from the point
of view of the urban form and the urban transport in the city.
Those researchers, and several others, have well demonstrated that develop-
ment and enhancement of public transport has a positive impact on the inser-
tion into the employment market of inhabitants of a city and its surroundings
(Donzelot 2004, Zenou 2000). The e¤ect of this insertion of inhabitants into
the job market has a direct e¤ect on the criminality in cities4 . In e¤ect, this
fact has as its consequence a decrease in crime rates in the city because of the
lower motivation of inhabitants to commit crimes; thus, an increase in social
interactions takes place (Glaeser, Sacerdote, Scheinkman 2004, Brueckner 2001,
Zenou 2003). This reduction of crimes and increased social interaction is, in
general, more evident in poor neighbourhoods than in rich ones (Donzelot 2004,
Bearse 1996).
1Gary S. Becker. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 169-217
2Data are generally available for the entire city as a whole and not for each of the zones
that compose the cityMoreno 2005.
3 It perfectly follows the theory of Broken windows; Wilson J.Q. and Kelling G.L. 1982.
4Note that in this research, criminality and crime will enclose ve types of criminal activities
and do not take in consideration large-scale crime.
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Additionally, studies about crime have incorporated a spatial approach that
has taken on greater importance in the past two decades see Freeman et al
(1996), Anselin (1998), Cohen, Tita (1999), Formisano (2002), Di Tella, Zenou
(2003), Schargrodsky (2004) and Moreno (2008), among others.
However, even if there are several studies that have already looked at the spa-
tial dependence, spatial dissemination and/or spatial conguration of crime, no
studies treating links between and the possible e¤ect of public urban transport
on crime evolution were found, except the study by Moreno (2005).
The originality of this research consists in proving that the evolution of
urban crime could be boosted or decreased by the presence or lack of such of
enhancements of public transport or by the development of new public urban
transport. More precisely, this study intends to prove that, even if the total
criminality in a city may decrease after the implementation of a new urban
transport system, there could also be adaptation of criminals in some zones of
the city. In other words, criminals may also enjoy the benets of the new system
in order to commit their crimes in zones which they could not access before.
A spread of some types of crimes in some areas a¤ected by the new transport
system may take place. This research tries to prove that hypothesis.
1.2 Contextualization of the case of study
This study focuses on the city of Bogotá, which is one of the most densely
populated cities in Latin America and the world but, paradoxically, does not
have a subway system or a system of trams. The city has more than seven
million inhabitants and was part of the group of cities considered the most
dangerous in the world in the early 2000s.
Bogota is divided into 1175 zones composed of around 2350 neighbourhoods.
Each neighbourhood has a socio-economic status which is calculated with re-
spect to the amenities of each neighbourhood, the materials with which the
house is built, the degree of accessibility for inhabitants of each neighbourhood
and many other characteristics of the houses and the quarters correlated to the
level of income of people. There are six socio-economic strata: stratum 6 de-
notes the population with the highest level of income and strata 1 denotes the
poorest population of the city.
From 1960 until the end of the 1990s, the city had a chaotic urban transport
system served by old buses and taxis of di¤erent kinds and di¤erent sizes. The
service of public transportation was assured by private entrepreneurs (more
than 60!) and public administration did not play a part in the utilities of
5UPZ in spanish Unidades de Planeamineto zonal or zonal planning units
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the system. Its role was just that of regulator; it assigned and dened the
buses lines as well as the companies that had to assure the service6 . This
method created ine¢ ciencies regarding the quality and coverage of the service
in all zones that compose the urban area, in parallel with several problems of
corruption. Actually, some deputies that made part of the council of the city
and that had as task to dene the companies to assure the service on the city
have been involved in a¤airs of corruption and clientelism.
At the end of the 1990s, the elected mayor7 decided to reform the public
transport system managed by private entrepreneurs into a system managed by
a public-private partnership. With the new system, public administration has a
core role in the regulation of the system, allocation of lines, administration and
the exploitation of the new system.
Since its opening in December 2000, this new public transport system, called
Transmilenio (henceforth TM), based on an integrated Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)
system, has had a reputation as one of the most popular and successful BRT
systems in the world. Mobility in the city changed radically, with a notable
reduction in travel times and continued expansion of the system to various zones
of the city. Today the system reaches more than 50% of zones of the city, and
although the old system with old buses is not closed, TM system moves about
1.8 million passengers per day, representing almost 15% of total daily trips in
the city, at an average speed of 27 km/h.
As stated above, the objective of this research is to determine if the TM
system induced positive or negative changes on levels of di¤erent types of crime.
In order to face of this hypothesis, this research compares crime rates taking
into account the period (after or before the opening of TM system) and also
identifying the zones that benet from the system or do not.
To treat the subject of this research, the paper proceeds as follows. After
a brief literature review and a brief contextualization of the case under study
in this rst section, section 2 describes available data. Section 3 describes the
econometric methodology used in the paper. Empirical ndings are presented
in section 4 and conclusions are o¤ered in section 5.
6Administration used to dene the lines and to assign the winnerentrepreneurships after
doing a call of tender
7Enrique Peñalosa was elected for a period of three years : 1998-2000
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2 AVAILABLE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS OF DATA
This paper uses a big and very rich database of each crime in the city between
2003 and 20088 . The collection of crimes was possible through collaboration
with the Conict Analysis Resource Center9 and with the permission of the
Metropolitan Police Department of Bogotá (MEBOG). It supposes that every
crime was spatially referenced with the exact addresses and the exact day and
time when each incident took place. In order to organize the information for
each UPZ, this study clusters all the events to their respective UPZ.
This research is focused on ve types of crime:
 Number of homicides
 Number of robberies carried out against people with violent aggression
 Number of thefts against people
 Number of burglaries of commercial establishments
 Number of house breakings
This research focuses on comparison of the number of crimes and on an
econometric analysis of crimes committed in each UPZ before and after the
opening of TM. Table 1 describes the statistics for each type of crime on zones
that are beneting and those that are not beneting from the TM system.
In addition, this study captures data of crimes committed after the inaugu-
ration of the two rst corridors, Calle 80and Caracas, on December 2000,
but before and after the opening of the three other sections of TM10 .
In e¤ect, TM is a transport system planned to have more than 13 corridors.
Three other corridors were opened after 2000. The rst one is called Americas
and was opened on December 2003. As this paper uses data from January 2003
to December 2008, the analysis takes into consideration crimes committed 12
months before the opening of the corridor called "Americas" (from January 2003
to 31 December 2003) and 12 months after its initiation (from 1 January 2004
to 31 December 2004).
8More than 150.000 incidents were recorded during the period between 2003-2008
9 In spanish: Centro de Recursos para el Analisis de Conictos - CERAC
10Transmilenio has today seven di¤erent main corridors: Troncal 80, Caracas, Autopista
Norte, Americas, NQS and Suba. From 2012, two new corridors were opened (Carrera, 10
and Avenida 26)
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Regarding the two other corridors that were opened later (NQS and Suba11),
this study takes into consideration data of crimes committed 18 months before
and 18 months after their opening.
The last ve lines of table 1 indicate some characteristics of each zone, such
as amenities, area and density, among others. Nonetheless, these data were not
available for every year and every UPZ of the city; thus, the study considers that
they are constant over time. This study uses these data as control variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics before and after the opening of each
corridor of TM
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Thefts to people crimeteft 112 72,5 43,68 16 138 50,7 30,8 14 123
Burglaries to commercial
Establishments
crimecom 112 43,5 23,61 12 77 41,9 25,65 15 99
House Breakings crimehouse 112 32,6 29,76 1 91 27,1 18,75 3 55
Homicides homicides 112 23,6 23,87 2 76 19,6 23,31 0 74
Robbery to people with
violent aggresions
agressions 112 87,22 67,79 3 226 87,36 79,35 2 285
Thefts to people crimeteft 112 112,95 70,08 6 230 178,9 113,82 0 394
Burglaries to commercial
Establishments
crimecom 112 85,04 76,17 1 300 81,45 74,41 0 317
House Breakings crimehouse 112 56,81 39,58 0 131 51,27 39,26 0 155
Homicides homicides 112 23,4 20,05 0 76 19,27 17,83 0 74
Robbery to people with
violent aggresions
agressions 112 87,22 67,79 3 226 87,39 79,35 2 285
Thefts to people crimeteft 112 231,30 122,19 14 387 230,13 112,09 18 399
Burglaries to commercial
Establishments
crimecom 112 126,30 75,35 6 239 125,87 84,76 18 308
House Breakings crimehouse 112 125,87 95,92 3 310 94,75 60,65 5 198
Homicides homicides 112 22,25 19,72 0 63 22,25 20,82 2 62
Robbery to people with
violent aggresions
agressions 112 181,25 175,12 25 539 223,62 242,42 18 728
Area of the zone in
hectares
hectares 112 375,47 180,08 79,83 992,33 375,47 180,08 79,83 992,33
Number of inhabitants per
hectare
density_hec 112 181.16 105.27 1,00 526,00 181.16 105.27 1,00 526,00
Establishments providing
Cultural activities
culture 112 8,12 8,18 0,00 40,00 8,12 8,18 0,00 40,00
Establishments promoting
Welfare
soc_welf 112 63,25 63,83 0,00 288,00 63,25 63,83 0,00 288,00
Establishments provinding
Health
health 112 3,53 3,24 0,00 15,00 3,53 3,24 0,00 15,00
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
s
N
Q
S
S
u
b
a
A
m
e
n
i
t
i
e
s
Before TM After TMTM
Section
Variable per UPZ Label Obs
Authors calculations
Regarding data from table 1, it can be observed that with respect to the
Americascorridor the average number of every type of aggression decreased,
except the average number of robberies against people involving violent ag-
gression, which did not change. In the case of the NQScorridor, the average
number of burglaries of commercial establishments, the average number of house
11NQScorridor opened on July 2005 and « Suba » corridor opened on May 2006.
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breakings and the average number of homicides decreased. Nevertheless, the av-
erage number of robberies against people with violent aggression did not change
and the average number of thefts from people increased. Finally, regarding the
Suba corridor, just the average number of house breakings decreased after
the opening of TM; the average number of robberies against people involving
violent aggression increased signicantly and the average number of the three
other kinds of crime did not change.
Those remarks could suggest that the impact of TM on each type of crime
depends on the moment, the zone and other characteristics of each zone. On
the other hand, it may also suggest that the opening of TM did not have an
e¤ect on crime rates.
In e¤ect, another fact, that there is non-negligible, is the di¤erence in the
number of amenities in UPZ with TM system and UPZ without TM system.
Table 2 shows that UPZ which benet from TM have a higher number of ameni-
ties than those which do not benet from the system12 . These di¤erences vary
between 20% and 37%. Nonetheless, there are two kinds of amenities among
the seven taken into consideration that are more numerous in UPZ without the
TM system: the number of establishments providing cultural activities and the
number of establishments providing social welfare, at 13% and 17% respectively.
Table 2: Amenities UPZ with vs without TM system
sec_justice rec_sport culture education health soc_welf parks Total
No TM 0,98 11,66 8,28 33,08 3,45 65,38 49,66 172,49
TM 0,55 9,18 6,64 29,82 4,27 43,73 36,00 130,18
Diff -44% -21% -20% -10% 24% -33% -28% -25%
No TM 0,87 10,44 8,55 31,33 3,10 65,37 47,94 167,60
TM 1,22 15,22 6,43 38,30 5,17 55,04 49,78 171,17
Diff 41% 46% -25% 22% 67% -16% 4% 2%
No TM 0,92 10,91 8,04 31,70 3,60 61,07 45,60 161,84
TM 1,13 18,00 9,13 46,50 2,63 91,63 83,75 252,75
Diff 22% 65% 14% 47% -27% 50% 84% 56%
No TM 0,88 10,15 8,49 29,76 3,14 67,04 44,50 163,95
TM 1,05 13,89 7,39 38,61 4,29 55,87 55,76 176,87
Diff 20% 37% -13% 30% 37% -17% 25% 8%
All zones
Americas
NQS
Suba
Authorscalculations
Regarding the di¤erences of amenities between each TM corridor, table 2
shows that for the Americascorridor, zones that are beneciaries of this trans-
portation system have fewer amenities than zones not passed by the Americas
corridor. On the contrary, with respect to two other corridors, the number of
amenities is higher in zones beneting from the NQSand SubaTM corri-
dors.
12Last line of the table 2
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Figure 1: Criminality on each zone vs criminality on citywide
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Graph 1 presents the dynamism of each type of crime in each of the three
zones studied on that paper. This dynamism is shown by the evolution of
each type of crime before and after the opening of the three TM corridors. As
stated above, the analysis takes into account crime rates over 36 months (18
months before and 18 months after the opening of TM). However, because of
the impossibility of gaining information on crimes in 2002, only 24 months were
taken into account (12 months before and 12 months after) in the analysis of
crime along the Americascorridor.
Regarding the evolution of crime with respect to the Americas corridor,
graph 1 shows that every type of crime decreased after the opening of TM, with
the exception of the number of homicides. In e¤ect, contrary to table 1, graph
1 shows that after the inauguration of TM, the totality of homicides did not
change in zones reachable by TM but increased citywide.
On the other hand, crimes in the NQScorridor had a di¤erent evolution.
The number of thefts from people increased in zones reachable by TM and also
in the other zones of the city after TM opened its service. Regarding the number
of burglaries of commercial establishments and the number of robberies against
people with violent aggression, crimes did not experience major changes after
the implementation of TM. Similarly, these crimes increased when citywide data
was taken. House breakings also increased in zones beneting from TM after
the implementation of the system; the opposite was the case with respect to the
total number of crimes in the city. Finally, the number of homicides decreased
after the opening of TM, both in zones reachable by TM and citywide.
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Regarding crimes in zones connected to the Suba corridor, except for a
decrease in the total of burglaries of commercial establishments, crime rates did
not change after the opening of the TM system. The same is the case for the
rest of the city. It may be inferred that the TM system had a positive e¤ect
just on burglaries of commercial establishments; other types of crime were not
inuenced by this system of transport.
To complete the description of the available data by each type of crime, this
article intended to establish a comparison of crime rates before and after the
implementation of the TM system by UPZ just on the three zones that are the
object of analysis. Graph 2 presents the levels of the ve types of crime in each
UPZ that beneted from TM before and after its opening.
Each point of the graphs represents one of 38 UPZ connected to at least
one of the three corridors analysed. The horizontal axis denotes the number of
crimes before the introduction of TM and the vertical one denotes the number
of crimes after the opening of the TM system.
The dots placed above the diagonal are the areas where crimes increased
after the inauguration of the transportation system. It means that if the level
of crimes decreased in a zone, the point that represents this zone will be below
the diagonal line.
Figure 2: Criminality on each zone that benet before and aftr the opening of TM
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In graph 2 it can be observed that on 17 of 38 UPZ concerned, present an
increasing of the number of thefts to people after the introduction of TM. In
other words, almost the 45% of the zones connected to at less, one of these
three corridors of TM, had an augmentation of this type of crime. Concerning
the number of burglaries of commercial establishments, 16 of 38 UPZ (42%)
experienced an increase in that type of crime, similar to the number of house
breakings, which increased in 14 of the 38 UPZ (37%) connected to the three
corridors concerned. The number of UPZ where crimes on that the integrity
of the people is threatened (robberies to people with violent aggressions and
homicides) increased on less UPZ (6/38 and 10/38, 16% and 26% respectively).
3 METHODOLOGY
This research is focused on establishing the possible e¤ect (negative or positive)
of three main corridors of the Transmilenio system with respect to the number
of crimes in di¤erent zones that compose the landscape of Bogotá. In order
to identify a possible causal relationship between the TM system and its e¤ect
on criminality, this article decided to implement the Di¤erence in Di¤erence
method13 .
This methodology, which has become widespread since the initial work by
Ashenfelter and Card (1985), deepened by other researchers like Millainathan
(2004), Hansen (2007a, b) among others, has as its principal objective to de-
termine the causal relationship between the implementation of a policy and its
possible outputs on di¤erent groups. The goal of this technique is to evaluate the
impact of a policy on output over di¤erent groups in two time periods. Those
groups are indexed by treatment status. One part of the sample is supposed
to be a beneciary of the treatment in the second period but not in the rst
period; this represents the treatment group. The other part of the sample is not
supposed to benet from the policy in either period but, even if they are not
inuenced by the policy, their characteristics are very similar; they represent
the control group.
Mathematically, the outcome of interest for this study (total crime of each
UPZ i), Yi is denoted by:
Yi = + Ti + ti + (Ti:ti) + Xi + "i (1)
13Di¤-di¤ from now
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With:
 = constant term
 = treatment group specic e¤ect
Ti = binary variable: T = 0; 1 where 0 indicates zones i that do not benet
from TM system and 1 indicates zones i beneciary from TM system
 = time trend common to control and treatment groups
ti = the two time periods: 0 represents the time period before the implemen-
tation of the policy and 1 represents the time period after the implementation
of the policy
 = di¤-di¤ estimator which represents the true e¤ect of the implementation
of TM system
 = e¤ect of some explicative variables or covariates (in the model treated
on this paper, they are constant14)
Xni n explicative variable of each UPZ i.
"i random unobserved error. It supposes that the error term is on average
zero: E ["i] = 0 and that it is not correlated to other variable of the equation.
As shown in Equation 1, the number of crimes committed in each UPZ i
is denoted by the output Yi over a sample of 112 di¤erent UPZ that compose
the city. The di¤-di¤ estimator  is dened as the di¤erence in average output
in the treatment group before and after the opening of the TM system (those
that benet from the TM system) minus the di¤erence in average output in the
control group before and after the opening of TM in each UPZ (those that do
not benet from TM system).
Regarding the di¤-di¤ estimator, it takes the following form:
 = Y T1   Y T0   (Y C1   Y C0 ) (2)
Where:
Y T0 and Y
T
1 denote the sample averages of the outcome for the treatment
group before and after the TM opening. Y C0 and Y
C
1 denote the sample averages
of the outcome for the control group before and after the TM opening.
To verify if the criminality in the UPZ served by the three relevant di¤erent
corridors of TM is determined by the opening of the system, Equation 1 is
regressed. After regression of Equation 1, the signicance of  is tested in
order to nd the signicance of the estimator. It will indicate if there are also
di¤erences in crime rates between treatment and control groups after and before
14Covariates are constant due to the impossibility to have this information for each zone
and each year.
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the opening of the system and if there is a positive or negative impact of the
TM system on crime rates on each UPZ.
Regarding the regressions, this study makes one regression for each kind of
crime with respect to each of three corridors of TM that are the subject of this
research. It supposes one result for each type of crime for each corridor. There
are ve types of crime and three corridors, which means that there are 15 results
(ve for each corridor).
Equation 1 takes the following form:
Y kij = + Ti + ti + (Ti:ti) + Xi + "i (3)
Where k = one of the ve type of crime and j = one of the three corridors,
Amercias, Suba, NQS
Thus, Y kij represents the number of crimes of type k committed on UPZ i
and with respect to the corridor j.
4 RESULTS
After applying the di¤-di¤ method, table 3 displays results for each corridor
and for each type of crime.
Regarding the oldestcorridor, Americas, which takes into account crimes
12 months before and 12 months after the opening of TM, it can be observed
that there are two types of crime that increase because of the implementation
of the system: the number of thefts from people and the number of robberies
against people with violent aggression increase in the 12 months that follow the
opening of TM. Nonetheless, this increase is not statistically signicant.
On the other side, the amount of the other three types of crime decreased due
to the implementation of the system. However, the only statistically signicant
estimator is the one regarding the number of homicides on that corridor. The
others two do not have statistical signicance.
Regardless of the type of crime, the total number of crimes increases due
to the TM. Nevertheless, it is not statistically signicant. It can be explained
because of the big di¤erence in the estimators between those which increase
(thefts from people and robberies against people with violent aggression) which
are not statistically signicant, and those which do not increase (the rest).
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Table 3: Di¤-Di¤ results
Type of Crime Americas
(2003-2004)
NQS
(2004-2006)
Suba
(2005-2007)
All period
(2003-2007)
Thefts to people 2,344 -1,516 -2,993 -1,810
Burglaries To Commercial
Establishments
-0,255  -2,883*** -1,318 -1,363*
House Breakings -0,587 -0,756 1,513 -0,010
Robbery to people with
violent aggresions
0,516 0,007 1,746 2,654
Homicides -0,772**  -0,429* 0,617** 0,288
Total type of crimes 0,650 -4,300* -2,709 1,528
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Authorscalculations
Concerning criminality with respect to the NQS TM corridor, table 2
shows that, contrary to what is observed for the Americascorridor, robberies
against people with violent aggression represents the only type of crime that
increases after TM. Nevertheless, this estimator is not statistically signicant.
It means that the number of thefts from people decreases, as does the number
of burglaries of commercial establishments, the number of house breakings and
the number of homicides.
However, just two estimators of these types of crime are statistically signif-
icant: those of the number of burglaries of commercial establishments and the
number of homicides (statistically signicant at 1% and 10% respectively).
This may infer that the implementation of the TM system on the NQS
corridor led to a decrease, with statistical signicance, of the number of those
types of crime. In e¤ect, these coe¢ cients indicate that there is a di¤erence on
2.883 and 0.429 crimes between the UPZ that benet from TM and those that
do not benet from the system.
Results of the regression of the totality of criminality show that the number
of crimes decreases statistically signicantly (10%). It may be explained by the
fact that just one kind of crime increases while the other four types of crimes
fall.
Regarding the SubaTM corridor, results are also di¤erent. In e¤ect, just
two kinds of crime decrease due to the TM system: the number of thefts from
people and the number of burglaries of commercial establishments. Neverthe-
less, these estimators do not have statistical signicance.
Among the other types of crime that increase due to the TM corridor Suba,
just the number of homicides has statistical signicance (at 5%). The amount
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of the other two types of crime grows but in a lower proportion with respect to
the decrease in the other types of crime, which may explain the results for the
total of crimes.
In e¤ect, results from the regression of the total number of crimes with
respect to this corridor indicate that the di¤-di¤ estimator is negative. This
means that the total number of crimes decreases due to the opening of the
Subacorridor.
The last column of table 2 shows that, regardless of the TM corridor, between
January 2003 and November 200715 two types of crime increase because of the
TM system. In e¤ect, the di¤-di¤ estimator shows that the number of robberies
against people with violent aggression and the number of homicides are higher
due to the implementation of the TM system in the city. Nonetheless, these
estimators are not statistically signicant.
The other three di¤-di¤ estimators indicate that, due to the TM system,
the amount of that type of crime was reduced. However, just one estimator
among these three types of crime is statistically signicant at 10%: the number
of burglaries of commercial establishments.
Regardless of the type of crime and the corridor, the total number of crimes
increased between January 2003 and November 2007, but the estimator is still
not statistically signicant.
A summary of table 3 may be provided. It shows that:
 TM causes an increase in the number of thefts from people just for the
Americas corridor, but the di¤-di¤ estimator for this variable is never
statistically signicant.
 The number of burglaries from commercial establishments decreases on
every corridor and also for the period between 2003 and 2007 because of
TM system; the di¤-di¤ estimator is only statistically signicant for the
NQScorridor.
 House increase just with respect to the Suba corridor. The estimator
has no statistical signicance.
 The number of robberies against people with violent aggression increases
on every corridor, and also regardless of the corridors (fourth column),
due to the opening of the TM system. Nevertheless, this estimator has no
statistical signicance.
15Twelve months before the opening of « Americas » corridor and 18 months after « Suba
» corridor
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 The number of homicides with respect to the opening of TM corridors
decreases on Americasand NQScorridors but increases on the Suba
corridor. These estimators are always statistically signicant.
 Regardless of the type of crime, criminality decreases on the NQSand
Suba corridors but increases on the Americas corridor due to the
opening of the TM system. Regardless of corridor and types of crime,
criminality increases between 2003 and 2007 due to the implementation of
the TM system.
Finally, as stated above, it can be noticed that the only corridor that presents
an increase in criminality is Americas. In parallel, it is also the only corridor
that presents fewer amenities in zones that benet from TM with respect to the
number of amenities in zones that do not benet from the TM system. However,
amenities are invariant for every period, which limits the analysis of this article
regarding the importance of the impact of amenities on crime rates with respect
to transport system enhancements.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Several researchers have studied the link between public transport and its im-
pacts on urban density, urban employment and hedonic prices. This paper has
tackled the impact of enhancement of public transport on ve di¤erent types of
urban crime in 112 di¤erent zones of Bogotá.
Results suggest that the enhancement of the public transport system repre-
sented by the introduction of a new public transport system has a causal e¤ect
on crime rates.
However, results are not homogeneous on all corridors regarding all types
of crime. Even if a causality relation is demonstrated for some corridors of
Transmilenio, it suggests that the impact of public transport improvements on
crime rates for each zone of the city is not unidirectional.
Notwithstanding this, two types of crime have constantly evolved with re-
spect to the opening of three di¤erent corridors of Transmilenio: the number
of burglaries of commercial establishments and the number of robberies against
people with violent aggression. The rst one saw a reduction in the number of
crimes while the second experienced an increase in the number of crimes.
Among the ve types of crime that were the object of this paper, just one
type has statistically signicant results which imply that the TM system has
a direct impact on that type of crime: homicides. However, the impact is not
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the same on the three corridors that are object of this study, reinforcing the
fact that, even if TM has a direct e¤ect on crime rates, this e¤ect does not only
depend of the presence of TM. Other variables may inuence this evolution.
Regardless of the type of crime but taking into account total criminality on
each corridor of the TM, this paper found that crimes increased in just one
of those corridors due to the construction of TM: it is the case of zones that
benet from the Americassection. The Transmilenio system seems to be the
principal cause of this increase. Nonetheless, an important question about this
result emerges with respect to the amenities of each area that make up the city.
Along this Transmilenio section, the zones beneting from the system have
fewer amenities than the ones that do not. This may suggest that the number
of amenities in each zone of the city has also an important e¤ect on crime
rates. Nevertheless, data regarding amenities are invariant because they are not
available for each zone and for each period. A study with data for each zone
and for each period should be done to conrm this hypothesis.
Finally, it is well known that behaviours like criminality may have a spatial
dependence or a spatial correlation that may clarify in a better way the evolution
of crime rates in di¤erent zones of a city. A study focusing on this last subject
should be done.
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6 Annexes
Evolution of criminality on TM corridor Americas; before vs after
Authors calculations
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Evolution of criminality on TM corridor Suba; before vs after
Authors calculations
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Evolution of criminality on TM corridor NQS; before vs after
Authors calculations
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